Moritz Altenried, Manuela Bojadžijev, Leif Höfler, Sandro Mezzadra, and Mira Wallis

Logistical Borderscapes: Politics and Mediation of Mobile Labor in Germany after the "Summer of Migration"

Has Europe been experiencing a migration or refugee "crisis" since 2015? It would be fair to stress that the periodic eruption of crises has haunted and, in a way, prompted migration control and border management both in specific countries and at the level of the European Union at least since the early 1990s. "Crisis" has indeed been an internal moment to the workings of the border and migration regime that has taken shape in Europe in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty and within the framework of the Schengen acquis (see New Keywords Collective 2016). This regime has been compelled since its inception to come to terms with the autonomy of migration, with the multiple challenges posited by tumultuous migratory movements to borders as well as to the governmental schemes, taxonomies, and discursive distinctions (between "forced" and "voluntary" migration or "refugees" and "economic migrants") that were presumed to manage them (Mezzadra 2015). The unbearable human costs of these challenges cannot obscure the materiality of the autonomy of migration. In the "long summer of migration" in 2015 (Hess et al. 2017), this autonomy, under specific conditions that deserve a careful investigation, literally exploded—radically and

The South Atlantic Quarterly 117:2, April 2018
DOI 10.1215/00382876-4374845 © 2018 Duke University Press

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effectively challenging for a moment the European border regime as a whole and producing a deep crisis of European migration policies and with this a crisis of Europe as political space (Bojadžijev and Mezzadra 2015).

What interests us is what happened *after* the summer of migration. This article is part of our ongoing engagement with the autonomy of migration approach, which we have contributed to shaping (see, e.g., Bojadžijev and Karakayali 2007; Bojadžijev 2008; Mezzadra 2006, 2011). In our own understanding, this approach has nothing to do with a "romanticization" of migration and does not detach its investigation from an analysis of the "structural" conditions within which movements and struggles of migration take place. It rather takes the subjective dimensions of migration as an angle from which the structural conditions can be more effectively studied and criticized. This is particularly the case for formations of capital and labor, since we emphasize the relevance of these formations in order to understand contemporary mobility regimes even when the question of labor does not seem to figure prominently—as, for instance, in the case of refugees and asylum. As the editors of this issue stress in their introduction, there is a need today to address the shifting figure of refugees and asylum from the autonomy of migration approach (which also can imply, of course, a revision and adaptation of the latter). Here we focus on the specific blurring of the notions of refugees and economic migrants that characterized the transformation of German migration politics during and after the summer of migration. Understood as a field of tension and struggle, the mobility of labor constitutes an important arena for examining the government of migration as well as the continuous challenges to it by migrants.

The autonomy of migration produces effects that go well beyond the ability of practices and experiences of migrants to reframe metropolitan, national, and transnational spaces. But a focus on the autonomy of migration also requires a careful investigation of the remaking of mobility regimes in a time of dramatic geopolitical shifts and as a reaction to the challenges of migration. We begin by examining the reorganization of the border regime in Europe after the summer of migration and then focus on the politics deployed by the German government and by various institutions and actors, both public and private, to put to work the refugees who arrived in 2015 and 2016. On the basis of research we conducted in 2016 and 2017, we test our hypothesis on the pronounced "logistification" of migration regimes.[1] But first we introduce the general topic of "logistics and migration," with a short genealogical analysis of the European border and migration regime and some reflections on the relations between capital, migration, and labor to further clarify the theoretical framework of our research.

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The European Border and Mobility Regime

Counting the deaths in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Atlantic Ocean, or along the eastern borders of the European Union has become an almost impossible, although painfully necessary, task, which poses complex and highly politicized problems of representation (see, e.g., Cuttitta 2016; Heller and Pezzani 2016; Last et al. 2017). The militarization of vast stretches of borderland and of maritime spaces, coupled with the digitization of control, the creation and operations of Frontex (the European Union's border management agency), and the proliferation of detention camps, seems to instantiate the image of "Fortress Europe," of a border regime simply and violently aimed at keeping migrants and refugees out of the European space. Nevertheless we are convinced that a more accurate investigation of the operations of the border regime demonstrates that it has always acted to filter and hierarchically manage migration.

Far from being marginal aspects of the European integration process, the establishment and the evolution of the border regime have played crucial roles in the production and constitution of the European space since the birth of the European Union. The heterogeneity of that space and its colonial and postcolonial history and present, often emphasized by scholars (see, e.g., Bhambra 2016), have been enabled and "mirrored" by the multiple scales of operation of the European border regime. Articulating "freedom of movement" within the Schengen space with a variable geometry of control of the "external frontiers," this regime has always also and simultaneously been a labor and mobility regime (on this notion, see Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013). "Externalization" of border control, which means involvement of "neighboring" and "third" countries in the management of the European borders, has been a key feature of this regime at least since the agreements between Germany and Poland in the early 1990s (see FFM 1995). The multiscalar geography of border control thus established has built over the past two decades the overarching framework within which multiple vectors and practices of mobility (internal as well as external, even in illegalized forms) have traversed, constituted, and materially transformed the European space.

The current crisis of the border regime has its own genealogy, which includes important moments such as the economic crisis that hit Europe in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/8—with its implications particularly for Southern European countries like Italy and Spain, where illegalized migrants had found employment in several economic sectors in previous years—and the uprisings in the Maghreb and Mashreq, with the fall of regimes such as those of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Muammar

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Gadhafi in Libya, which had played key roles in the processes of externalization (Tazzioli 2015; Garelli and Tazzioli 2017). On top of, but certainly not independent of, these developments, the summer of migration in 2015, with the unprecedented and uncontainable challenge posited by hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees to European borders across and beyond the "Balkan route," definitely accelerated and dramatized the disruption (see Kasparek and Speer 2015; Hess et al. 2017).

It is quite apparent that the "hotspot approach" proposed by the European Commission in the wake of the summer of migration is an attempt to tackle the crisis precisely from the angle of mobility (see Tazzioli 2016; Ansems de Vries, Carrera, and Guild 2016). What is striking in that approach is the widespread use of logistical terminology—*hot spots, hubs, platforms, corridors*—to establish a new geography and, in a way, a new rationality of migration management. The channeling of turbulent, unpredictable, and autonomous movements of mass migration through "spaces of exception" and governmentalized routes is meant to enable a process of filtering and selection (Kasparek 2016).

It is easy to see, nevertheless, that this plan of "logistical" reorganization of the European border and mobility regime does not work on the ground. Some "hotspots" are simply transformed into contention and detention centers, while others are used as control devices of "secondary movements" of refugees within the European space—which mean the stubborn and autonomous practices of mobility through which refugees continue to challenge European borders (see, e.g., Garelli and Tazzioli 2016; Sciurba 2016; Antonakaki, Kasparek, and Maniatis 2016). The tendency to "renationalize" border controls, which is apparent in several European countries, definitely contributes to producing this situation. The hot spot approach of the European Union and the tendency toward renationalization create a kind of fatal "double pincer," radically limiting the mobility of hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees in countries like Greece and Italy, while haunting more generally people actually or potentially on the move toward Europe.

Logistics and Migration

Defining the "hotspot approach" as a project of "logistical" reorganization of the European border and migration regime implies for us a more general reference to the lively critical debates surrounding "logistics" in recent years (see, e.g., Neilson 2012; Harney and Moten 2013; Cowen 2014; Easterling 2014; Grappi 2016; Rossiter 2016). As several geographers, political theo-

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rists, anthropologists, and urban studies scholars have pointed out, the so-called revolution in logistics that took place basically in the United States in the 1960s and found its epitome in the shipping container was predicated on a "systems approach" that integrated production and distribution within what management guru Peter Drucker called in 1965 "the whole process of business" (see Cowen 2014: 32). While "physical distribution" (as it used to be called) was affected by the problem of minimizing costs after production, logistics, as Deborah Cowen demonstrates, is interested in "value added across circulatory systems" (24). This shift led to the emergence of a radically new mobility paradigm. Contemporary global capitalism would be simply inconceivable without this new mobility paradigm. In brief, the revolution in logistics has enabled, on the one hand, a new extensive expansion of the capitalist mode of production through a radical reorganization of "supply chains" across the globe (see, e.g., Tsing 2009). On the other hand, due to its intensive effects, it has spurred an increasing intertwining and merging of production and circulation, prompting a profound reshaping of urban spaces, which today takes extreme forms through a large number of "remote sensing technologies" as well as digital platforms, such as Uber, Foodora, and Airbnb (see, e.g., Srnicek 2017).

What are the implications of the new mobility paradigm (Cresswell 2006; Urry 2007) associated with logistics, as well as with its constitutive intertwining with processes of digitalization, for human mobility, for migration? This question has been seldom raised in migration studies and, in our opinion, can open up new fields of critical research, shedding light on a set of tensions and conflicts that crisscross contemporary migration. In general terms, we think that there is much to be gained from casting a logistical gaze on migration. We imagine such a gaze not as exclusive or even privileged but rather as intertwined with other gazes in the study of migratory movements. A constitutive aspect of this logistical gaze is that it focuses on the articulation of migration with other forms of mobility and, above all, on the ensuing conflicts, tensions, and gaps. A further characteristic is that (to echo Drucker on logistics) it considers the whole process of migration.

This is not, of course, something completely new in migration studies. Moreover, the so-called mobility turn in social sciences confronts the field precisely with the challenge to focus on the connections and disconnections between heterogeneous practices and forms of mobility (see, e.g., Hui 2016). But the "added value" of a logistical gaze is, for us, that it enables an integrated understanding of the materiality of the heterogeneous infrastructural skeleton of migration from the angle of broader processes that are dramatically

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reshaping contemporary capitalism—which means the world in which we live. To cite a single example, the financial infrastructures that crisscross "the whole process of migration" and are particularly important in (although not at all limited to) the case of remittances have co-shaped the development of finance, posing new challenges and often leading to the invention of new technologies and products that more generally spur the expansion of finance's frontiers.

What interests us in this article is the growing role played by the panoply of agencies and brokers in the intermediation of labor migration. Xiang Biao and Johan Lindquist (2014) propose the concept of "migration infrastructure" to come to grips with this role. Based on their long-term field research on "low-skilled" labor migration from China and Indonesia, this concept nicely captures the commercial, regulative, technological, humanitarian, and social dimensions of the apparatus of intermediation that increasingly shapes migration—both spurring and managing, routing and limiting it. The resulting channels and corridors of mobility, within which migrants are often "moved by others," as Xiang and Lindquist aptly stress (143), compose a geography that closely resembles the operative spaces of logistics, striated by supply chains and their infrastructures. It is on the role of such "migration infrastructure" in attempts to "put to work" refugees in Germany since 2015 that we focus our research.

Taming the Mobility of Labor

Our own understanding of the autonomy of migration approach continues to be eminently shaped by a focus on the constitutive role played by heterogeneous forms of labor mobility—ranging from "voluntary" to "forced" and often blurring the boundary between these two poles—in the historical development of capitalism (see Mezzadra 2016). This constitutive role of labor mobility continues to shape our present. In the wake of the increasing flexibilization of labor markets, what has been described as a "new migrant division of labor" has emerged in many "global cities." In the case of London, for instance, Jane Wills and colleagues (2010: 1) write that the city "now depends on an army of foreign-born workers to clean its offices, care for its sick, make beds, and serve at its restaurants and bars." And they join other scholars and activists who speak of the migrant as the "paradigmatic worker of the world" today (6). Heterogeneous forms of migration, for example, of "skilled" workers connected to the development of knowledge and digital economies and "unskilled" (and often seasonal) workers in agriculture, fur-

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ther demonstrate its strategic relevance to the working of contemporary capitalism (see, e.g., respectively, Shachar 2006 and Corrado, de Castro, and Perrotta 2016).

These are just snapshots witnessing the relevance and heterogeneity of labor mobility and migrant labor in contemporary capitalism, which are met by the prominent roles migrants play in labor struggles in many parts of the world. These snapshots could easily be multiplied. What is more important here, however, is that to be made productive, labor mobility has to be tamed—which implies the establishment of a complex, and of course historically and geographically variable, set of control devices that aim at filtering, disciplining, and often even blocking mobility. The operations of these control devices result most notably in the production of a special status or, rather, a panoply of special statuses for migrant workers, which, at the same time, connect them to processes of valorization and accumulation of capital and trace multiple boundaries within the composition of living labor.

What is at stake here, to put it in Marxian terms, is precisely the production and reproduction of labor power as a commodity. In a classic essay on the topic, Michael Burawoy (1976) tackles this problem by distinguishing two aspects of the reproduction of a "labor force," what he calls its "maintenance" and its "renewal." And he adds that "under capitalism the distinction between these two elements . . . is normally concealed" since "the same institutions simultaneously perform both renewal and maintenance functions" (1051–52). What distinguishes migrant labor, Burawoy writes, is precisely that its recruitment "not only makes the distinction apparent but is even defined by the separation of the processes of maintenance from those of renewal" (1052). They take place in geographically separate locations and are managed by different institutions.

Burawoy's emphasis on the externalization of crucial aspects of the reproduction of the labor force (which means, in Marxian terms, the production and reproduction of labor power as a commodity) remains an important contribution to the study of migrant labor. What the autonomy of migration approach allows us to add is that the production and reproduction of labor power as a commodity are processes crisscrossed by specific conflicts and lines of antagonism, which structurally pertain to capitalism and nevertheless are to be distinguished by the way the antagonism between capital and labor manifests itself in the production process. This has two important implications that we have tried to operationalize in our research. First, we do not simply aim at studying the "integration" into and the position of migrants in an already constituted "labor market." Our own understanding of the

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autonomy of migration approach rather leads us to problematize the very notion of labor market, shedding light on the processes of its continuous (re)constitution and on the tensions and conflicts that shape them. Second, a focus on migration from this point of view also implies a rethinking of the *operaista* notion of class composition, which we continue to consider strategically relevant. Also, the composition of what we can call with yet another Marxian concept "living labor" has to be conceived as open to the processes of its continuous making and remaking. Movements and struggles of migration cut across these processes and inscribe onto the composition of living labor the specific set of tensions and conflicts related to the production of labor power as a commodity (see, e.g., Bojadžijev, Karakayali, and Tsianos 2003).

The Emergence and Pitfalls of a Logistical Rationality in European Migration Management

Keeping in mind Burawoy's distinction between the "maintenance" and the "renewal" of a specific labor force, it is easy to make sense of the postcolonial and "guest worker" recruitment schemes that characterized the transition to mass production and "Fordism" in Western Europe after World War II as an attempt to treat migrant workers as a kind of supplement to the stock of labor power present within the bounded space of the national labor market. This attempt was predicated on specific statistical measures, in a way enabled by the relative rigidity and standardization of mass industrial production (see the classic study by Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack [1973]). The autonomy of migration haunted these migrant labor recruitment schemes since their inception, and at their height it also took the form of spectacular struggles led by migrant workers in several Western European countries, among them the German Federal Republic (see Serafini 1974; Bojadžijev 2008). These struggles deserve a careful investigation by anyone interested in understanding the genealogy of the present with regard to migration to and in Europe.

What interests us more here, however, is that beginning in the mid-1970s a set of radical shifts began to alter the governmental rationality regarding migration and labor in Europe—and not only in Europe. In the framework of increasingly restrictive trends that led to processes of mass illegalization in several countries and to a revision of asylum laws in others, the flexibilization of labor markets usually associated with neoliberalism implied at the same time a multiplication and a fragmentation of labor

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migration recruitment schemes. This became particularly apparent in the 1990s and the early 2000s, finding a kind of systematization in a "green paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration" presented in 2005 by the European Commission (COM 2004 811 final). Temporary, circular, and seasonal migration increased, and "green cards," fast-track procedures, and sector-specific recruitment programs proliferated (see Menz and Caviedes 2010; Vosko, Preston, and Latham 2014). We see in this multiplication and fragmentation of labor migration recruitment schemes an attempt to "tame" and valorize the increasing autonomy of migration. Also, the introduction of points systems by several member states of the European Union (from the United Kingdom to the Netherlands, from Denmark to the Czech Republic) is part of the attempt to "read" this autonomy and this turbulence from the angle of a notion such as "skills," which has definitely taken on specific, "cultural" meanings but remains, nevertheless, strictly linked with the neoliberal concept of "human capital." More generally, in Europe as elsewhere in the world (see, e.g., Xiang 2012), theories and practices of "migration management" (see Geiger and Pécoud 2010) are haunted by the fantasy of a "just-in-time" and "to-the-point" migration. And once the kind of "delivery" rationality that underlies it is taken into consideration, it is not difficult to see that it is a logistical fantasy.

As we mentioned above, the start of the "sovereign debt" crisis led to a kind of slowing down, if not a standstill, of the efforts to coordinate migration policies at the European level. Nevertheless, those efforts as well as a panoply of regulations of heterogeneous origin have profoundly reshaped European labor markets. In the framework of globalization and Europeanization, no labor market in Europe is anymore bordered and regulated in exclusively national terms (see Menz and Caviedes 2010: 6–8). The tensions crisscrossing the field of labor mobility take on peculiar characteristics in contemporary Europe. Several heterogeneous vectors, routes, histories, and experiences of mobility traverse and shape European labor markets (see Fedyuk and Stewart, forthcoming). "Internal" migration in Europe has intensified over the past decade, due both to the eastward "enlargement" of the European Union and to the effects of the financial and economic crisis and the related austerity policies in Spain, Greece, and Italy, and not the least in the United Kingdom and other countries of the European North.

"Postings" made by subcontractors and agencies that provide temporary workers within the "pan-European labor market" created by the European Union's Posting of Workers Directive (96/71/EC) are yet another important instance of internal labor mobility (see Wagner 2015). It is easy to

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see that the "mobility regimes" lying behind these movements of migration are quite heterogeneous among themselves, while at the same time they radically differ from regimes of mobility that spur and contain international migration (which are again far from homogeneous). A multiplication of borders within labor markets and related processes of segmentation and "ethnicization" lay the basis for the creation of "precarious spaces" (Wagner 2015: 1373) across Europe. It should not be difficult to understand that this situation raises important challenges for the ability of the unions to claim workers' rights, while the field of mobility emerges once again as strategic for labor organization and struggles.

Germany: Refugees as "Unexpected Labor Power"?

These dynamics can be observed also in the German case, corresponding both to the forms of regulation of the labor market and to the specific history of migration and migration management in the country. The tension between the need for migrant labor and the logics of cultural and political closure, which has shaped migration policies in many parts of the world at least since the late nineteenth century (see Mezzadra 2006), is particularly pronounced here. One can see this tension at work in the forging and mutations of the "guest workers" system from 1955 to 1973. For the purposes of this article, it is important to note that after the *Anwerbestopp* (recruitment stop) in 1973—the same year, not coincidentally, of a formidable wildcat strike of migrant workers at the Ford plant in Cologne and of the oil crisis that is conventionally taken to have spelled the end of Fordism—the figure of the refugee came to occupy the center of migration policies in (West) Germany. While the majority of guest workers remained in the country and family reunification both increased the number of migrants and changed their composition, the question of "integration" came to the fore in public discourse during the 1970s, posing a paradox with the often repeated dogma that the Federal Republic was not a "country of immigration." Since one had to be a refugee to legally access the German territory, asylum increasingly came under public scrutiny, and figures such as "economic refugees" or "bogus refugees" became commonplaces for anti-immigration rhetoric in the mid-1980s. After unification in 1990 and the arrival of huge numbers of people of "German ancestry" from Central and Eastern Europe as well as of refugees escaping wars in Yugoslavia and Iraq, the German government reacted with a campaign against migration. Neo-Nazi attacks in such places as Hoyerswerda and Rostock-Lichtenhagen and a reform of article 16 of the

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constitution in 1993 restricting asylum sealed the whole process (see Bojadžijev 2008: 249–52; Karakayali 2008: 155–75).

Since the early 1980s, a crucial feature of German migration policies has been a prohibition on asylum seekers working; although modulated over the years, it has remained a kind of dogma in the attempt to distinguish between refugees and "economic migrants" (Bojadžijev 2008: 246–49; Karakayali 2008: 174–77). Even before the summer of migration, however, this situation had begun to change, due to European pressures and to local experimentations. What seems particularly important to us is that both within the federal government and among entrepreneurial organizations, multiple voices were advocating for a shift in how to consider the relation between refugees and "labor market integration" in the face of a persistent need for migrant labor in Germany. In 2012 the government issued an "action plan" to target refugees with specific measures designed to "tap" the "potential labor power already present in the country" (Deutsche Bundesregierung 2011: 115). This debate continued in the following years as employers' associations, single firms, and regional chambers of commerce gave their input (see Mayer 2015: 19). Crucial within this discussion were several proposals to screen the refugee population for the "skills" and "human capital" needed by the "German economy."

The need for a connection between "asylum procedure" and "integration" into the labor market, which had been kept carefully separated up to that moment, started to be more broadly discussed within the government and the public sphere. In 2014 a model project, "Early Intervention—Everyone Has Potential," was launched. Jointly designed by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, or BA), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, or BAMF), and the European Social Fund, the project aimed to "early identify potential skills for the labor market and to establish targeted intermediation services" (Deutscher Bundestag 2015: 45–46). A BAMF employee (2016) explained to us in an interview that this project has been pivotal for establishing cooperation between BAMF and the BA, a collaboration that was previously "unwanted" due to the separation of asylum and the integration process during the asylum procedure. He argued that a shift was necessary: "The people are doomed to inactivity, because the asylum procedures take way too much time. On that account, the access to the labor market was set earlier." The close link between the need to screen the refugee population for "potential skills" and the establishment of intermediation services was to become even more apparent after the summer of migration. The emphasis

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on this link perfectly fits our hypothesis of an increasing logistification of migration regimes. The German government and private capital clearly took it as an opportunity to further experiment with such logistification, laying a new basis for future migration policies. It is in this sense that we speak of "unexpected labor power" with respect to these refugees, and opening the "black box" of intermediation has become for us a primary research task.

The pressures of private economic actors on the government to open up channels and tracks to allow what is often defined in a very telling way as a "change of lane" between refuge and work (see Robert Bosch Stiftung 2016: 19) grew dramatically during the summer of 2015. Several quantitative and qualitative studies were undertaken in order to grasp the "potential" of refugees for the German labor market (see, e.g., Fratzscher and Junker 2015; Wech 2016; Boockmann and Kohler 2016) as well as the "risks" of "failed integration" for the welfare state (see, e.g., Hentze and Schäfer 2016). Although the process had started in previous years, in the summer of migration, and under the pressure of the sheer massive and unexpected presence of migrants and refugees, a paradigmatic shift in attitude toward refugees in Germany eventually emerged and took on clearly distinguishable features that pointed to a pronounced "economization." Private labor intermediation agencies figure prominently among the economic actors that since the beginning shaped the debate on the "change of lane" for refugees. Already in April 2015, before the arrival of large numbers of refugees, the multinational human resource consulting firm Manpower (2015) advised the German government to loosen or even abolish the prohibition against refugees working, emphasizing that "Germany urgently needs skilled workers, which means that even if among them there are some economic refugees, there are no arguments against their integration if their skills are needed on the labor market." In an interview, an employee of a temporary work agency (2016) told us: "We don't make a difference between migrants [and] refugees, and for us [as a global player] the employment of migrants is daily business." This statement highlights the pioneering role in which many of these agencies see themselves in terms of the labor market integration of mobile workers.

Manpower's insistence that targeting refugees and asylum seekers as potential labor power could make an important contribution to fixing the problem of "skills" shortages on the German labor market is consistent with the discourse of other relevant economic and public actors, as we mentioned above. It may sound a bit uncanny, though, to find in Manpower's same press release a reference to Lampedusa in Hamburg, a radical collective of migrants and refugees who have struggled against the Dublin system since

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2013 (see, e.g., Tazzioli 2015: 11–12; De Genova 2015: 5). The firm's endorsement in its press release of one of the main claims of Lampedusa in Hamburg, not surprisingly, free access to the labor market, foreshadows the kind of unusual alliances and coalitions that built the contradictory framework for developing heterogeneous services of intermediation for integrating refugees into the German labor market in the wake of the summer of migration (see also Georgi 2016: 191–92). While several initiatives emerged from civil society, it is important to stress that even state actors acknowledge the need to rely for information and "expert knowledge" on the work done by the "solidarity and welcome initiatives" that blossomed in most German cities in 2015 and 2016 (Karakayali and Kleist 2016; Hamann et al. 2016). "They have what both the Federal Employment Agency and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees lack," explained the BAMF employee (2016) we quoted above, referring to the need to rely on social initiatives' expert knowledge in the framework of the "Early Intervention—Everyone Has Potential" project.

A humanitarian matrix intertwines, therefore, as a specific "encoding" of the work done by solidarity initiatives, with the pronounced economicization of refugee politics, paving the way for the emergence of hybrid discursive formations that play important roles in shaping current public debates in Germany. The initiative "Wir zusammen" ("We Together"), launched in February 2016 by large corporations (including Volkswagen and Deutsche Bank), is a good example of this intertwining of a humanitarian and an economic matrix. At the same time, the solidarity and welcome initiatives developed their own services in the field of labor counseling for refugees, while civil society and entrepreneurial organizations launched other joint initiatives, including digital platforms designed to facilitate the "matching" of refugee labor demand and supply. These initiatives are all part of the complex system and infrastructure of intermediation set up after the summer of migration in Germany to manage the integration of refugees into the labor market. The logistical rationality driving these multiple endeavors is apparent in the attempt to carefully calibrate the "delivery" of labor power according to the presumed needs of the labor market. There are clearly resonances with the rationality of the "guest workers" regime, but what makes the difference—and what we try to grasp with the concept of "logistification"—is precisely that the "needs" of the labor market have become much more flexible, imponderable, and even elusive. The homogeneous figure of the migrant (industrial) guest worker is therefore multiplied from within, giving way to a fragmentation of statuses that is to be managed by a complex set of devices, among which intermediation has crucial roles to play.

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While such devices are designed to perform a differential inclusion of refugees into the German labor market, it is important to stress that their operations are predicated on administrative labor that fosters processes of differential exclusion (for more on these ideas, see Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). After the summer of migration, parallel to the establishment of infrastructure for intermediation, there has been a tightening of German asylum law aiming at hierarchizing and dividing refugees into those with "good prospects" and those with "bad prospects" for staying in the country (Frings 2017). The main criterion of differentiation, of "clustering" as the official language has it (BAMF 2017: 12), is of course the country of origin. And while refugees with "good prospects" to stay in Germany are channeled toward the infrastructure of intermediation that should prompt their "integration" into the labor market, refugees with "bad prospects" are doomed to deportation. The administrative machine of differential inclusion and exclusion works (or at least is intended to work) in an integrated way, further prompting on a daily basis the fragmentation of the figure of the migrant and refugee. A strategic site in this regard is the network of "arrival centers" (*Ankunftszentren*), established in June 2016. These centers can be described as logistical hubs, where both the differentiation of refugees according to their country of origin and their channeling toward the labor market or deportation take place. In an interview, a BA employee (2016) described the centers' objective as creating the "logistical preconditions" for interlocking all administrative processes. The BA is only responsible for the last step undertaken in the centers, which is "profiling" to ascertain skills and qualifications, information that is then made available to the job center at the refugee's new place of residence (BA employee 2016). However, only those refugees who happen to have "good prospects to stay" reach that step. The logistification of refugees' labor recruitment is thus matched by a logistification of deportations.

The complex infrastructure of intermediation that we investigated in our research project definitely fits the logistical fantasy of a just-in-time and to-the-point labor migration. This does not mean that all the actors involved in the infrastructure operations share or even pursue this fantasy. That is not at all the case regarding solidarity and welcome initiatives in particular. The logistification and economization of asylum politics is a slippery terrain for such initiatives. While helping refugees find work might increase their chances to stay and mentioning the contribution refugees (can) make to the national economy has become a powerful argument in the discourse around migration politics, such arguments also lead to the economization of that

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discourse, which also means to the increasing primacy of economic over humanitarian and other arguments in the discussion on migration politics.

The attempt to finely tune and calibrate these patterns according to the "skills" and "human capital" of refugees, on the one hand, and the flexible "needs" of the labor market, on the other, demonstrates the influence of a logistical fantasy. If one thinks, for instance, of the widespread use of a phrase such as "change of lane," it is easy to draw parallels with the logistical concern with "intermodalism" and "interoperability" (see Cowen 2014: 44–45; Rossiter 2016: 56–57). Nevertheless, it is important to stress that a "just-in-time" and "to-the-point" migration remains a fantasy. And as Ned Rossiter (2016: 65) writes regarding "interoperability," one has always to remain aware of the "discrepancy between the calculus of the plan and the world as it happens." This implies that "the most interesting sites to study are those where interoperability breaks down," due to a multiplicity of "bottlenecks," disruptions, and frictions "in the form of labor struggles, infrastructural damage, software glitches, supply chain problems, and so forth" (64–65). Rossiter's point is crucially important for the study of logistics. We are convinced that it is also relevant for investigating the "logistification" processes of migration management and mobile labor recruitment schemes. Although it is important to keep in mind that governmental fantasies produce their effects even when they are not fully accomplished or fail, the investigation of the sites where they "break down" is a crucial research task.

The Reality beyond the Fantasy

Logistical rationalities are haunted by their internal contradictions. In the German case, these contradictions and tensions continue to shape the regulation logics of labor market and migration politics. The resulting limits to the effectiveness of intermediation were emphasized by several of our interviewees. "A lot of really interesting refugees get lost" because of such limits, declared a local coordinator of "Early Intervention—Everyone Has Potential" (2016). However, the "integration process" is shaped by a multiplicity of temporalities, often conflicting with one another, such as language skills, the search for an apartment, or acknowledgment of education grades as well as numerous waiting periods for relevant documents or responses from the authorities involved. "We would really like to employ many more refugees," an employee of a temporary work agency (2016) told us in an interview, "but we cannot find them." This statement clearly reflects the problem of the different temporalities that delay refugees' access to the labor market. But it

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also opens up an interesting perspective on another crucial factor that runs against the effectiveness of the logistical fantasy of a "just-in-time" and "to-the-point" labor migration: the stubbornness with which migrants and refugees continue to affirm their autonomy after settling in Germany.

Logistical fantasies are often based on planning and prediction. In reality, however, they are more often than not belated fantasies. Independently of what one can say about the effectiveness of labor market integration programs, in the case of the summer of migration logistification came late, as an attempt to tackle the temporary breakdown of migration policies brought about by the presence of a huge number of "unexpected" migrants and refugees. The attempt to address refugees as potential labor power was therefore permanently haunted by the "emergency," and the strategies, practices, and desires of migrants continue to clash with logistical rationalities.

Also, many refugees attempt to eschew the formal infrastructure of intermediation and build their own labor market strategies, relying on friends, relatives, and existing migrant networks. However, the formal and informal infrastructures of intermediation as well as the formal and informal work settings resulting from the operations of these infrastructures should not be understood as completely separate. They are rather deeply entangled. As our interviews with refugees highlighted, job hunting through informal infrastructures runs parallel to dealing with the pragmatic strategies of the official public placement service, the "job center." One of our interviewees, a refugee from Syria, reported to us that the job center practically "doesn't know anything about [him]" (2017). He made use of the German-language courses financed by the job center and completed the required integration course, but he tried to prevent saying anything about his future plans in order to avoid queries and sanctions. Similarly, he had already defied the state control mechanisms while he was still waiting for the outcome of his asylum application. Although according to the "residence obligation law"—which restricts people's movement as well as their place of settlement and against which refugee activists have struggled since its introduction in 1982—he was not allowed to leave the administrative district of his official accommodation without special permission or permanently, he moved to Berlin, prepared for his studies, found a shared apartment, and took on a side job. Hence, while public institutions are busy evaluating refugees' "potential" and are overwhelmed with the logistical task of offering suitable language courses and integration measures, many refugees practically "integrate" themselves into the labor market in their own way. It is important to stress that many of the above-mentioned strategies remain largely invisible for the formal infrastructures of labor intermediation.

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Furthermore, our research demonstrates that the image of a "shadow economy," developing and operating "in the dark," secluded from "regular" employment circumstances, is rather misleading. That is because the boundaries between formal and informal economies are blurred, while documented and undocumented workers are often closely intertwined. A widespread arrangement, for instance, combines official registration as "marginally employed" with payment of the minimum wage of €8.84 per hour, increased with undocumented extra time at a lower wage, such as €5 per hour. As a consequence, the definition of the "informal" economy as the counterpart of the formal economy has once again to be questioned (see Cyrus 2001: 210). Regarding refugees' positioning on the German labor market, there are—among others—three significant aspects of the informal economy. First, it represents a strategy of informalization on the side of capital to lower labor costs. One of our interviewees deduced from his own and his friends' experiences that newly arrived refugees are particularly affected by these practices of informalization since employers are able to exploit their lack of knowledge about the German wage system and labor rights. Second, the informal economy results from the legal exclusion of one part of the refugee population (mostly those with "bad prospects to stay") from the labor market. In this sense, we can think of "illegality" as a product of state law (Bojadžijev 2008: 145). Third, informal work is also an important strategy of refugees—as well as many others affected by the Hartz IV regime (the fourth stage of the Hartz reform of the labor market and welfare system in Germany, which took effect on January 1, 2005)—to complement their low social benefits in order to pay off the debts for their migration or to bring over other family members. Moreover, confronted with the job centers' integration measures and mediation attempts that often include unpaid internships as an entry point into a low-paid apprenticeship, many refugees decide to work in the informal economy, as we confirmed in interviews with refugees conducted in Berlin in March 2017.

Multiple tensions arise between the logic of labor mobility and the logics of asylum. We can observe the shortcomings of logistical rationalities, which enhance rather than prevent informality in terms of the organization of life and labor—particularly where people actively avoid them. "I am worried about integration, everything else is logistics," declared the director of an emergency shelter for refugees in Berlin's former airport Tempelhof (Schleiermacher 2016). In his imagination, logistical rationalities and devices are meant to manage mobile labor according to what he fantasizes as the smooth circulation of commodities. In a way, we could gloss, his concerns about "integration" betray his awareness that things are a bit more

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complicated. Labor power, as we know, is a commodity unlike any other. Its mobility has special qualities, as the autonomy of migration shows by pointing to migrants' subjectivity.

Note

This article is based on an empirical study we conducted as part of the project "Politics and Mediation of Mobile Labor," which took place in May–December 2016 at the Berlin Institute for Empirical Integration and Migration Research, Humboldt University, and received funding from the minister of state in the Federal Chancellery and the federal government commissioner for migration, refugees, and integration. We conducted eleven qualitative interviews with public, private, and civil society actors involved in placement services. In a small follow-up study in early 2017, we interviewed three refugees about their perspectives on the placement services as well as their strategies in the labor market and in dealing with German authorities (Altenried et al. 2017). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are ours.

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